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I discuss the ideas of common sense and common sense morality in Sidgwick. I argue that, 
far from aiming at overcoming common-sense morality, Sidgwick aimed purposely at 
grounding a consist code of morality by methods allegedly taken from the natural sciences, 
in order to reach also in the moral field the same kind of “mature” knowledge as in the 
natural sciences. His whole polemics with intuitionism was vitiated by the a priori 
assumption that the widespread ethos of the educated part of humankind, not the theories of 
the intuitionist philosophers, was what was really worth considering as the expression of 
intuitionist ethics. In spite of the naïve positivist starting point Sidgwick was encouraged by 
his own approach in exploring the fruitfulness of coherentist methods for normative ethics. 
Thus Sidgwick left an ambivalent legacy to twentieth-century ethics: the dogmatic idea of a 
“new” morality of a consequentialist kind, and the fruitful idea that we can argue rationally 
in normative ethics albeit without shared foundations. 
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1. The first truly academic work in moral philosophy? 
 
According to an often-quoted sentence by Brand Blanshard, 
Sidgwick was an attractive figure «not because he showed surprising 
individual traits but because he did not»1, and an eminent figure of Anglo-
American ethics such as John Rawls declared that The Methods of Ethics 
was «the first truly academic work in moral philosophy which undertakes to 
provide a systematic comparative study of moral conceptions, starting with 
those which historically and by present assessment are the most 
significant»2. Bart Schulz’s recent biography has turned this image upside 
                                                 
1 Blanshard, 1974, p. 349.  
2 Rawls, 1981, p. v.  
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down by presenting Sidgwick as a troubled, problematic, and even 
disquieting figure, somewhat closer to a fin-de-siècle sceptic and cosmic 
pessimist such as Friedrich Nietzsche undoubtedly was than to Rawls’s idea 
of the modern professional moral philosopher3.  
I will discuss how Sidgwick’s  ambivalent attitude, somewhat in 
between that of a positivist and that of one more death-of-God mourner has 
much to do with many of his own uncertainties on quite central points of 
ethical theory, namely: (a) the nature and method of philosophy in general 
and moral philosophy in particular; (b) his ill-defined notion of “common 
sense”, (c) his even less defined idea of a “common sense morality”, (d) his 
invention of a straw-man named “dogmatic intuitionism”. But I will argue 
also that, the positivist self-image of his own work and the pessimist and 
sceptical conclusions he reached on the possibility of a rationally justified 
normative ethic notwithstanding, Sidgwick’s discovered one important idea 
that he left as a legacy to David Ross, John Rawls, and Beauchamp and 
Childress, namely the idea of coherentist procedures for amending, 
improving, and reconciling contrasting moral judgements with each other. 
 
 
2. The decisive and most important task of philosophy 
 
The Methods of Ethics is a strange book that has been interpreted in 
almost opposite ways, either as a classical utilitarian work or as the modern 
formulation of ethical intuitionism. In order to find a way out of such 
opposite interpretations I suggest that we should try reading it from the 
starting point provided by Sidgwick’s pre-comprehension of his own task.  
While reconstructing the biographical path that had lead him to The 
Methods of Ethics he says that as a young man he started feeling that 
traditional moral rules he had been taught exerted «external and arbitrary 
pressures»4 and were «doubtful and confused»5. Such traditional morality 
seemed to him to be identical with the one Whewell presented in his 
Elements of Morality and the compulsory reading he had to do of the work 
as a Cambridge student left him with the impression that «intuitionist 
                                                 
3 Schultz, 2004.  
4 Sidgwick, 1907, p. xv.  
5 Ibid.  
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moralists were hopelessly vague (in comparison with mathematicians) in 
their definitions and axioms»6. 
On the other hand the kind of utilitarianism that had been formulated 
by John Stuart Mill seemed to him attractive for its earthly and empirical 
character, even if far from convincing mainly because of Mill’s defective 
attempt a providing a “proof” of the principle of utility. Besides, he found 
good reasons in favour of intuitionism in Butler and in Kant, but also others 
in favour of utilitarianism in Butler himself, his intuitionism 
notwithstanding, and finally reasons in favour of “common sense morality” 
in Aristotle, Reid, and Spencer. As a remedy to his own doubts and 
uncertainties he resorted to the project of studying, without trying to 
establish the correct ethical principles first, the kind of connections 
subsisting between various ethical principles and their consequences. He 
believed that moral philosophers had made the mistake of starting with the 
search for correct moral principles and believed that his project resembled 
the purely theoretical attitude that should be characterize the philosopher, or 
better the scientist,  «the same disinterested curiosity to which we owe the 
great discovery of physics»7. The task of ethics would be then just 
«considering which conclusions we will rationally reach starting with 
certain ethical premises»8, that is, «to discuss the considerations which 
should… be decisive in determining the adoption of ethical first principles», 
not «to establish such principles; nor… to supply a set of practical directions 
for conduct»9.  
In order to understand what he precisely meant when he proposed 
the adoption of the disinterested curiosity allegedly inspiring the inquiries 
carried out by natural scientists, it is important to reconstruct Sidgwick’s 
idea of science, philosophy, and knowledge. His first claim is that 
philosophy is a kind of «scientia scientiarum»10; the second is that the goal 
pursued by philosophy is systematisation, a «fully unified knowledge» or a 
«consistent whole» of «rational human thought»11; the third is that it suffers 
from a lag when compared with the sciences, that it is still «in a rudimental 
state in comparison with the more specialised studies of those field of 
                                                 
6 Ibid.; on Sidgwick and Whewell see Cremaschi, 2008.  
7 Ibid., p. vi. 
8 Ibid., p. xix. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Sidgwick 1902.  
11 Ibid., p. 34. 
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systematic knowledge that we name sciences»12, we cannot meet the same 
«consensus among experts that may be found in issues of geometry, physics, 
botanic»13.  
Up to now, all this sounds much like Herbert Spencer’s Positivism; 
other claims seems to be of a rather different nature.  
One is that the borderline to be established between “knowledge” 
(that is, a belief considered to be well-founded) and “common sense”, that 
is, those beliefs that, even if sharing «the characteristic of general 
acceptance»14, yet «do not present themselves as self-evident or derived 
from self-evident premises»15. Philosophy has its own method, partly 
similar and partly different from the method of the sciences: it is based on 
intuition, error, and amendment of error by means of reflection (in turn 
consisting of consensus with other qualified individuals plus introspection 
and analysis of language). Sidgwick adds that he does not rule out that 
«philosophy may use the introspective method»16, and in fact, when faced 
with two alternative claims, he declares that he finds «both such beliefs 
fundamental» in his own thinking «with as much clarity as may be found in 
the process of introspective reflection»17. 
Another claim quite incompatible with Spencer’s Positivism is that 
the whole of human knowledge includes not only theoretical but also 
normative beliefs. According to Spencer, the sciences yield knowledge of 
«what exists or has existed or will exist». According to Sidgwick we cannot 
consistently claim that the task of moral or political philosophy is 
establishing the coexistence and succession of phenomena, and that we 
should accordingly acknowledge that philosophy in general should also treat 
the «principles and methods for rationally determining what ought to be»18. 
Practical philosophy is a field different and parallel to the one Spencer 
named “philosophy”, but the «decisive and most important task of 
philosophy»19 is precisely solving the «problem of coordinating these two 
partitions of its subject and connecting fact and ideal»20. Yet, not all of 
                                                 
12 Ibid., p. 12. 
13 Ibid., p. 5. 
14 Ibid., p. 172. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid., p. 49. 
17 Sidgwick, 1889, p. 43.  
18 Sidgwick, 1876, p. 24. 
19 Ibid., p. 30. 
20 Ibid. 
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ethics is philosophy. casuistry, not unlike law and politics that are more 
“arts” than sciences, «certainly is not philosophy»21; the proper task of 
philosophy in the practical domain is «“unifying” the principles and 
methods of reasoning that lead to practical conclusions»22 like philosophy in 
the theoretical domain unifies the principles and methods of the sciences of 
nature.  
The source whence we extract the «principles and methods» is only 
«common sense» or «the thought which we all share»23, since we «want to 
preserve harmony with common sense»24, and on some occasions we just 
cannot adopt some particular conclusion for the simple reason that we are 
not prepared to betray «our deepest convictions»25. In other words, 
philosophy  
 
uses primarily what I would call the dialectical method, that is, the method of 
reflection on the thought we all share, by means of symbolism we all share, that is, 
language26.  
 
Accordingly, what philosophy can afford in the practical domain is:  
 
(i) finding “intuitions” that may be justified; 
(ii) reflecting on the body of beliefs “we” share;  
(iii) detecting inconsistencies in such body of beliefs; 
(iv)  looking for inconsistencies between the above and the whole of 
natural sciences as a body of knowledge with which the beliefs of 
common sense should be made compatible27. 
  
And yet, how much real “knowledge” may actually be produced in 
this way is one of the points about which most of Sidgwick’s doubts 
concentrate.  
 
 
 
                                                 
21 Ibid., p. 26. 
22 Ibid., p. 31. 
23 Sidgwick, 1902, p. 40. 
24 Ibid., p. 215. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid., p. 49. 
27 For more detailed discussion see Cremaschi, 2006.  
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3. What is properly Common Sense?  
 
The idea of “common sense”, frequently mentioned by Sidgwick, is 
an idea with a respectable traditional philosophical pedigree dating back to 
the Stoics and Cicero, an idea that was rescued by the Scottish philosophers, 
first among them Thomas Reid. Sidgwick may have met it first in William 
Hamilton, who had tried to combine the Scottish with the Kantian 
philosophy and was the target of one of John Stuart Mill’s attacks as a 
dogmatic thinker. Mill contended that his “introspective” method was 
unable to account for the genesis of common sense beliefs in as plausible a 
way as James Mill’s associationist theory was allegedly able to do, and 
accordingly empiricism was the right and “progressive” approach while all 
aprioristic approaches were just devious devices for confirming traditional 
prejudice. 
The same idea was assigned a central role by Cambridge critics of 
utilitarianism, namely Samuel Taylor Coleridge, John Grote, John Frederick 
Denison Maurice, in so far as it was believed to be able to provide a 
justification for religion and traditional morality against the utilitarian 
attack28. 
The idea was only marginally accepted by another Cambridge critic 
of utilitarianism, William Whewell who emphasized instead rational (partly 
a priori) knowledge. He claimed, like Richard Price, that morality arises out 
of «intellect, not out of Sense»29, but added also that «no system of morality 
may be true unless it is a system according with Common Sense of 
humankind»30. 
Common sense was rescued by Mill as a consequence of his 
controversy with Whewell as a means of making utilitarianism less 
contrasting with traditional moral doctrines31. In Utilitarianism he argued in 
fact that the experience of humankind has accumulated a body of moral 
rules that have been selected on criteria suggested by some kind of 
«unaware utilitarianism»32, an idea that was later taken over by Sidgwick, 
and indeed was still shared by George Edward Moore himself. 
                                                 
28 See Cremaschi, 2006b. 
29 Whewell, 1854, p. 1 
30 Ibid., p. 11. 
31 See Cremaschi, 2006b. 
32 Mill 1838, p. 93; see also Mill, 1861, pp. 241-246. 
Sergio CREMASCHI 
 42   
 
4. What is properly Common Sense Morality?   
 
Granted the view of philosophy and its method that has been 
described above, Sidgwick gives a rather consistent answer to the question: 
what can philosophy do in the practical field? The answer is as follows: 
  
(i) singling out “intuitions” which may be eventually justified;  
(ii)  reflecting on the body of beliefs that “we” share;  
(iii)  hunting for inconsistencies within such a body of beliefs;  
(iv)  ferreting out inconsistencies also between the above and the whole 
of results of the natural sciences qua body of well-founded and 
consistent beliefs with which the beliefs of common sense should be 
harmonized.  
 
The first part of the task was believed by Sidgwick to be quite easy. 
In fact he writes: 
 
it only requires a little reflection and observation of men's moral discourse to make 
a collection of such [the intuitionists’ formulae] general rules, as to the validity of 
which there would be apparent agreement at least among moral persons of our own 
age and civilisation, and which would cover with approximate completeness the 
whole of human conduct. Such a collection, regarded as a code imposed on an 
individual by the public opinion of the community to which he belongs, we have 
called the Positive Morality of the community: but when regarded as a body of 
moral truth, warranted to be such by the consensus of mankind, – or at least of that 
portion of mankind which combines adequate intellectual enlightenment with a 
serious concern for morality – it is more significantly termed the morality of 
Common Sense33.  
 
The points deserving comment in the quote are the following: first, 
the shift from common sense morality to moral knowledge is made by 
systematisation; second, positive morality may looked at as either (i) a 
historically determined code of conduct, (ii) corpus of moral truths; third, 
the consensus about such corpus is by one part of mankind; fourth, such part 
of mankind has been singled out because of its (alleged) intellectual and 
moral superiority; fifth, the problem seems to Sidgwick to be less 
devastating than it is in fact because of his belief in ongoing moral progress 
by which errors will be amended and a more consistent and comprehensive 
                                                 
33 Sidgwick 1907, book III, ch. I, sect. 5. 
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moral view will be attained, and this implies not “just change” but 
“progress”.  
 
5. What is precisely dogmatic intuitionism? 
 
Sidgwick became famous in the Anglo-American world primarily 
for his (allegedly final) critique of so-called dogmatic intuitionism, 
constantly referred to as to the reason for not discussing any more William 
Whewell’s and Richard Price’s rationalist ethical theories, indeed a task to 
which Anglo-American moral philosophers have applied themselves with 
remarkable discipline for more than one century. In fact, in Sidgwick’s 
Methods no attempt is made to discuss the ethical theory of intuitionism, 
either in Price’se version or in Whewell’s, in a way comparable to the one in 
which utilitarian theory, as it had been presented by Bentham and Mill, is 
discussed in detail. 
An important point never mentioned by Sidgwick is that for Price 
and Whewell – unlike other less rationalist intuitionists, for example 
Thomas Reid – common sense has a marginal relevance, in so far as their 
own intuitionist theory starts with a set of self-evident propositions which 
are rationally justified in so far as they may be assumed to be undeniable 
without lapsing into contradiction. This is an assumption rather different 
from the different idea, accepted by the later Stoics Cicero, Reid, Coleridge, 
Morice and Grote, of a set of beliefs virtually shared by mankind at all time 
and place.  
As a consequence, Sidgwick’s undeservedly famous expression 
“dogmatic intuitionism” seems to connote something that is his own 
creation, and he never gives a precise denotation to the terms, that is, he 
neither makes it clear who the proponents of “dogmatic intuitionism” are 
nor what are precisely the claims of such doctrine.  
The suspicion is not unjustified that, more than a historically given 
philosophical current, “dogmatic intuitionism” is for Sidgwick some kind of 
a figure of Absolute Spirit, or a step in the path of Sidgwick’s own 
intellectual career, or a partner in his dialogue with himself that he had 
created just in order to refute it. Instead the famous book III of the Methods 
has been revered as the alleged last word on any kind of dogmatic and 
absolutist system of morality to the point that the Italian translator of The 
Methods, Maurizio Mori, has written that Sidgwick  
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proves that, when one formulates a principle in a clear and precise way, one has to 
acknowledge that it always admits of exceptions. Thus he spells out for the first 
time the claim that there are no absolute duties, that is, in technical jargon, that all 
duties are prima facie duties34. 
 
Yet, an important circumstance is that the book is not a criticism of 
Price’s and Whewell’s theories but instead a demolition of a straw-man, 
filled up mainly with items taken from Reid and other common-sense 
philosophers, not from such rationalist philosophers as Price and Whewell. 
But Reid’s common sense is not Price’s and Whewell’s intellect, and, even 
if also Reid may be classified as an intuitionist, he is not the proponent of 
the kind of ethical intuitionism that was being defended in the eighteenth-
century British discussion. In other words, what Sidgwick did is having 
recourse to the widespread rhetorical trick of attacking one really existing 
partner in the discussion – in his case, Whewell – by demolishing some 
other weaker target that is partially resembling the real target.  
 
7. Sidgwick’s exploded project of a scientific ethic, and how to make 
the best of its failure  
 
1. I started mentioning the fact that Sidgwick won in the Anglo-
Saxon world a fame as the author of the «most beautiful ethical treatise» 
that was ever written, or at least as somebody who succeeded in «creating 
the prototype of a modern treatise of moral philosophy»35 thus giving «to 
the problems of ethics the form that has been dominating in British and 
American moral philosophy from his time on»36, of a writer with an 
absolute impartial and scientific attitude, and more recently of a more 
credible putative father of analytic ethics than Moore may be37. Sidgwick’s 
intentions were in fact different; what he wanted to carry out was first of all 
a refutation of Samuel Coleridge’s, Frederick Denison Maurice’s, John 
Grote’s morality-based theodicy. In his anti-theodicy Sidgwick treats ethics 
not as a primary topic, but as a secondary topic, the primary one being the 
possibility of believing in a moral world-order. He did not succeed in his 
secondary project of founding a scientific ethic, but he apparently succeeded 
in his primary project of proving the non-existence of a moral world-order.  
                                                 
34 Mori, 1995, p. xxi. 
35 Schneewind, 1977, p. 1. 
36 Ibid., p. 422 
37 Gauthier, 1970, p. 7. 
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It is strikingly that he ignored, albeit while mentioning often its 
author, the different answer given by Kant to the same question. This 
answer carried the impossibility of any theodicy, the necessity of the moral 
law and, as a condition of possibility of the moral law, a solution to the 
problem of theodicy based on rational faith or on the postulates of practical 
reason.  
2. Sidgwick’s fame of impartiality and objectivity is undeserved, 
since he was “impartial” in the rather limited way a sceptic may be, in so far 
as his way of proving his own claims is the rather devious device of 
throwing down – how effectively is a different question – the claims he 
takes as his own targets one after the other. This image of Sidgwick’s work 
depends partly on the editorial aspect of his main work, that is, on its 
systematic structure following the model of the scientific treatise that was 
becoming fashionable in the age of Positivism. Besides, it may depend on 
the very fact of being a terribly boring book, as Sidgwick apparently knew 
too well in so far as he declared that it could not «fail to be somewhat dry 
and repellent»38. Adoption of such a model, far from being anti-rhetorical, 
was itself a cunning rhetorical move. It amounted to saying: I present my 
argument without any rhetorical flourish because I am a scientist, unlike my 
predecessors who were rhetoricians.  
3. The book, besides being far from impartial and objective, is more 
an essay than a treatise in so far as, far from covering systematically all the 
topics of such as an established subjects as Ethics, it develops instead an 
argument on one point (i.e., theodicy on a moral basis). One might add that 
it is far from well-documented and exhaustive on the theories it discusses, 
first of all intuitionism. This does not depend on unfairness or parti pris, but 
simply on the circumstance that his target was not discussing in a fair and 
comprehensive way what he believed to be the competing ethical doctrines 
of his time, but a different one, namely examining the promises and failures 
of common-sense morality.  
4. The proposal advanced by David Gauthier and others to date back 
analytic ethics to Sidgwick’s time needs be carefully considered. There are a 
number of reasons for under-stressing Moore’s originality vis-à-vis 
Sidgwick and for thinking that The Methods is in a sense a treatise in 
metaethics. But there are also reasons for refusing such presumption of 
fatherhood in favour of Sidgwick. One is that also Kant’s Foundation and 
Critique of Practical Reason are pure metaethics, and accordingly Kant 
                                                 
38 Sidgwick, 1906, p. 295. 
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should be recognized instead to be the true father of analytic ethics. Another 
is that those anti-empiricist elements which mark the break between Mill 
and Sidgwick and give the latter’s work its meta-ethical flavour are 
borrowed first from Whewell, and to a lesser degree from the British neo-
Hegelians (in both cases without due acknowledgement), and the very idea 
of a “philosophy of morality” is Whewell’s own idea, which would imply 
that it is Whewell, not Sidgwick, who should be acclaimed as the father of 
analytic ethics. 
5. An odd legacy left by Sidgwick’s war on intuitionism is the idea 
of “common sense morality”, a recurrent idea in analytic ethics that has 
been showing up in two different versions: a) the version adopted by those 
who, like Peter Singer, argue the case for a “new morality” and stress the 
inadequacy of “common sense morality”, its inability in providing solutions, 
and the non-existence of unconditionally valid precepts; b) the opposite one 
adopted by those who, like David Ross and John Rawls, stress the idea that 
the data of ethical theory are what “we” (the writer and the reader) “know” 
and that a theory holds if it succeeds in systematising already shared 
“intuitions”39.  
I believe that both alignments create more troubles than they are able 
to settle, and that the right thing to do would be getting rid of the very 
notion, since, once taken out of the context of the eighteenth-century British 
discussion, “common sense morality” does not denote anything, or better, it 
connotes in an undue way something that is quite familiar but may do 
without such an odd name. It is a thing that sociologists and anthropologists 
had started examining precisely in the decades between the first and the 
seventh edition of the Methods. Such an examination yielded in the first 
decades of the Twentieth century a discussion on cultural relativism that 
would have been unconceivable for euro-centric Victorian philosophers. 
The thing studied by anthropologists in fact was not just one thing, but 
instead it consisted of several different things, namely the moral codes of 
various societies. The “new anthropology”, that is Franz Boas and 
Bronislaw Malinowski, realized that the distinction – an obvious one for 
such Sidgwick’s contemporaries as Edward Tylor and  James George Fraser 
– between “more advanced” and “less advanced” societies or cultures is less 
obvious than the Victorians used to believe and that differences in moral 
codes adopted by different societies depend on more complex reasons than 
“advancement”. One discovery was that such codes are dependent on 
                                                 
39 As noted in Singer, 1974.  
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constellations of factors, namely economy, family, religion and more. 
Another was that accordingly they are, in a sense, all of them functionally 
justified and, to a point, “rational”40. They are not the result of an 
accumulation of mankind’s experience, as the Victorians, including such 
opposite camps as Samuel Coleridge and his followers on the one hand, and 
John Stuart Mill and Herbert Spencer on the other, tended to believe. In fact 
all the Victorians shared, albeit for different reasons, the uncritical belief 
that what comes after unfailingly succeeds in replacing what came before 
and that what humankind needs is just some more time, so that either divine 
revelation or empiricist philosophy and the positive sciences may carry out 
their own job of progressively enlightening it.  
6. Moral “intuitions”, if they exist, exist in at least two different 
senses, that is, either as axioms, for example such principles as a duty to 
keep promises that needs no justification besides the fact that it is in the 
very nature of a promise to be kept, or as considered opinions accepted in 
reflective equilibrium, for example such principles as religious freedom or 
some more or less equalitarian criterion of distributive justice. It is as well 
to note that neither axioms nor considered opinions have much to do with 
“common sense morality” or with the historically given moral codes of 
different societies.  
7. And yet, while following a path that he believed would lead 
toward a solution to the problem of theodicy, Sidgwick made a couple of 
suggestions for settling issues that are indeed relevant to ethics, and I would 
say more relevant than any answer to the unanswerable questions of 
theodicy.  
First, Sidgwick worked out a coherentist procedure for overcoming 
moral disagreement; second, he even discovered something rather close to 
reflective equilibrium. The useless ballast with which he overloaded both 
discoveries was made of such typical nineteenth-century paraphernalia as 
introspection, belief, common sense, scientific truths.  
What we can do of Sidgwick’s discoveries is not using coherentist 
procedures for building a rational, or even worse a scientific, ethics, as 
Sidgwick wanted to do. We may use them for a more modest and somewhat 
different project, the project of defining, if not “methods of ethics” at least 
“procedures of applied ethics”. These are procedures for arguing and 
reaching virtuous compromises between partners who have reached partially 
                                                 
40 See Cremaschi, 2007. 
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different ethical conclusions on general issues, and yet still share at least 
some moral judgements on particular subjects.  
The discovery of such procedures is the great discovery, or the obvious 
platitude, or the Columbus’s egg on which applied ethics rests. This 
discovery works comparatively well when it is not overloaded with 
theoretical assumptions or with attempts at proving general theoretical truths 
that may be left for further discussion, for example such claims as that there 
are no unconditional duties, or that old morality is useless, or that ethics is 
more healthy without religion.  
To sum up, not unlike Cristoforo Colombo who first believed he 
had discovered Catai and was disappointed later on in discovering he had 
not, also Sidgwick, after sailing in search of the moral world order, at the 
end of his own voyage reached the disheartening conclusion that «any 
attempt at framing a perfect ideal of rational conduct» is «foredoomed to 
inevitable failure»41. In fact he could have been a little bit more euphoric, 
since he had discovered, if not a new continent, at least Columbus’s egg of 
applied ethics. 
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